Models of Social Vulnerability to Disasters by Alexander, David
 RCCS Annual Review
A selection from the Portuguese journal Revista Crítica
de Ciências Sociais 
4 | 2012
Issue no. 4
Models of Social Vulnerability to Disasters
David Alexander
Electronic version
URL: http://journals.openedition.org/rccsar/412
DOI: 10.4000/rccsar.412
ISSN: 1647-3175
Publisher
Centro de Estudos Sociais da Universidade de Coimbra
 
Electronic reference
David Alexander, « Models of Social Vulnerability to Disasters », RCCS Annual Review [Online], 4 | 2012,
Online since 01 October 2012, connection on 30 April 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/
rccsar/412  ; DOI : 10.4000/rccsar.412 
© CES
RCCS Annual Review, 4, October 2012: 22-40 
 
22 
David Alexander 
Global Risk Forum, Davos, Switzerland 
 
 
Models of Social Vulnerability to Disasters
*
 
 
This paper discusses the bases of theory in the evaluation of social vulnerability to disasters. 
Vulnerability is shown to be the vital component of risk and the principal element of disaster 
impacts. Perception is a key process in decision making in disasters. It is affected by culture and 
symbolism, which are analysed in the context of disaster risk. A model of cultural metamorphosis 
is used to explain changes and discrepancies in attitudes to disaster and recovery processes. The 
response to the L'Aquila (central Italy) earthquake of 6 April 2009 is discussed as an illustration of 
processes of cultural metamorphosis and symbolic interpretation of disasters. The response was 
influenced by both modern and inherited cultural traits, which can be identified and analysed in 
order to explain public reactions to the event. A new model is proposed in which culture and 
history combine with physical hazards to influence vulnerability. 
Keywords: natural disasters; risk factors; resilience; L'Aquila earthquake (2009); sociology of risk; 
social vulnerability. 
 
 
Introduction 
For many years there has been an imbalance between the resources invested in disaster 
response and those dedicated to the prevention and mitigation of disasters. The world 
community and most individual countries have preferred to tackle the problem by 
responding to adverse events rather than anticipating them. There are several reasons why 
this position has become harder and harder to maintain. To begin with, knowledge of 
hazards is now substantial at the world scale and increasingly so at the local scale in many 
parts of the world (Mercer et al., 2010). Hence, a plea of ignorance no longer carries weight. 
Secondly, the number of people affected by disaster, about 280 million in 2010, is expected 
to rise to 375 million in 2015 (IFRCRCS, 2010). Thirdly, climate change will probably intensify 
meteorological disasters such as floods and storms (Birkmann and von Teichman, 2010). 
There are non-linear relationships between physical factors, such as average wind speed or 
flooding level, and damage such that the latter becomes disproportionally large in relation to 
increases in the former. Finally, in political and diplomatic circles, there has been a gradual 
realisation that the benefit-cost ratios for vulnerability reduction are so high that reducing 
disaster risk makes souŶd eĐoŶoŵiĐ seŶse. The UN’s International Strategy for Disaster 
Reduction (UNISDR) and its Hyogo Framework for Action, 2005-2015, have been critical to 
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this process (UNISDR, 2005). Hence, the problem of disasters has become difficult for 
governments to ignore. 
As a result of these factors, the early years of the new millennium are a period of intense 
change in the ways in which humanity understands, interprets and lives with disaster. Since 
1970 there has been an increasing divergence in the process of wealth accumulation 
between the minority of rich people and the majority of the poor (Massey, 1996). Although 
poverty and vulnerability to disasters are not perfectly synonymous, they are nearly so, and 
conversely, wealth can be equated with protection and safety. This simple balance, however, 
does not reduce the potential for massive financial losses in areas where both hazards and 
physical capital are heavily concentrated. 
Broadly speaking, vulnerability is the potential for harm or loss inherent in a person or 
thing (Weichselgartner, 2001). The word has specific meanings in particular disciplines, for 
example social work and psychology (Furedi, 2004). In disaster studies, it is the key to 
understanding impacts (Birkmann, 2006). Since the late 1970s there has been a gradual 
realisation that natural, technological, social and intentional (i.e. terrorism) hazards are 
merely the trigger of a set of complex reactions governed by the social, economic, cultural 
and physical vulnerability of society (Hewitt, 1983). Hence, there has been an increasing 
realisation that it is important to know and reduce human vulnerability to disasters in its 
many different forms. 
As a prelude to proposing new models of disasters and their abatement and 
management, the next section discusses the bases of theory in this field. 
 
Basic Models of Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) 
The word 'resilience' or 'resiliency' is sometimes thought to be derived from ecological 
studies of the survival of species (Adger, 2000), but in reality it has its origins about a century 
ago in the mechanics of materials testing. A resilient material has an optimum combination 
of rigidity, which enables it to resist an applied force, and flexibility, which enables it to 
absorb that which it cannot resist. Its breaking point occurs at a very high level of applied 
force (Avallone et al., 2007). By analogy, society needs to develop the capacity to resist and 
absorb (i.e. adapt to) the forces that cause disaster. Societal resilience involves the setting 
aside of resources against future contingencies, and the process of preparing to withstand 
future shocks (Manyena, 2006). At the root of it are prudence and foresight. 
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Caveat lector: there is an alternative to the conceptual equation that is so often 
employed to explain disaster risk (Alexander, 1991): 
 
 hazard × vulnerability [ × exposure ] = risk  disaster 
 
The world has accumulated a vast store of both material wealth and knowledge, but it 
has not established priorities that enable it to reduce disaster risk sufficiently to avoid 
massive and widespread suffering and misery. Given the propensity to spend – some would 
say squander – vast sums on largely unproductive enterprises (for example, three trillion US 
dollars on the war in Iraq), one might be tempted to rewrite the equation as: 
 
 hazard × waste [ × exposure ] = risk  disaster 
 
Be that as it may, disaster risk reduction should involve investigating the hazards, 
protecting local populations, planning and preparedness to use resources wisely, hazard 
avoidance (where possible) and incident management. The key resources are knowledge, 
organisation and communication (Fothergill, 2000). None of these is necessarily expensive. 
The relative cost of information technology is falling, and mechanisms for sharing and 
diffusing knowledge are multiplying. 
Knowledge can be divided into three sectors: on hazard impacts, on community 
vulnerability, and on the coping mechanisms that produce resilience. It is necessary to avoid 
the tendency to relate the knowledge merely to past disasters, rather than to future ones. 
Scenarios are vital to understanding those hazards that can in any way be anticipated, 
especially the recurrent and seasonal ones, but a scenario is not a projection of the past into 
the future, rather it is an investigation of possible future outcomes with the aid of 
information gained from past events (Schoemaker, 1993). Changing vulnerabilities, emerging 
risks and intensifying hazards all conspire to ensure that disasters do not repeat themselves, 
even though they may have a degree of predictability. 
Disaster risk reduction is therefore a question of organisation and resources. The former 
can be divided into imposed organisation and self-organisation. Of these, the first is 
mandated by authority and comes from outside the community. It includes laws, protocols, 
directives and standards. The second involves indigenous coping mechanisms that the 
community develops for itself, including local planning and volunteer work (Mercer et al., 
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2010). Likewise, resources can be divided into those pertaining to the community and those 
provided from outside the area, in some cases at the scale of international disaster relief and 
assistance for risk reduction. Long experience has shown that there is an uneasy dialectic 
between indigenous and imposed disaster risk reduction (Mercer et al., 2007). In ideal 
circumstances, the best of local practice is complemented and reinforced by appropriate 
methodology derived from outside the area (Briggs, 2007). Such a balance is not easy to 
achieve, and it requires a mixture of cultural sensitivity, political equilibrium and plain 
common sense, as well as the technical know-how and social consensus to reduce disasters. 
Despite a need that stretches back through all of human history, in its modern form 
disaster risk reduction is a child of the 2000s (Alexander, 2008). It intertwines with the 
resilience and climate change adaptation agendas. It also responds to the imperative of 
sustainability. The world is consuming at least 50 per cent more resources than it can 
produce or find, and, moreover, it will have to adapt to warmer conditions and rising sea 
levels, as well as potentially more extreme natural phenomena that cause disasters (UNISDR, 
2009). These are some of the motives for advocating a sustainable response. 
Disasters can set back development. For instance, in Nicaragua it was estimated that 
Hurricane Mitch in 1998 did enough damage to retard development by 20 years (Wisner, 
2001). Hence, disaster risk reduction is part of the sustainable development agenda. 
However, sustainability is a controversial issue and there is no single definition of what is 
sustainable. There is, however, a consensus that sustainability requires a degree of harmony 
between humans and nature, and some level of conservation of the natural resource base 
(Saunier, 1999). Disaster risk reduction can contribute to the processes involved. In addition, 
there are questions of sustainability with regard to DRR in its own right. Programmes have 
failed because of lack of consistent funding, unclear or inappropriate objectives and lack of 
political or social support. In synthesis, sustainable programmes of disaster risk reduction are 
built upon governance, defined here as a participatory form of democracy in which 
institutions have public support and stakeholders are empowered such as to have direct 
involvement in decision making. Governance is at the root of vulnerability reduction, 
disaster preparedness and the development of coping mechanisms (Ammann, 2006). 
These observations constitute a simple framework for analysing human responses to the 
threat and impact of disasters. However, there is a need for new theory. Much of the 
existing body of theory stems from the ideas of cultural ecology, or human ecology, 
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promulgated in the 1920s and developed most fully in the 1960s (White, 1974). Since then 
there have been momentous changes in society, economy and the environment of life. 
Moreover, the accelerating pace of global change shifts the parameters of theory yet more. 
For example, the information technology revolution has been compared to the effect of the 
invention of printing (Quarantelli, 1997). It has had a profound impact on many different 
forms of human activity and social relations. If we are to understand disasters in the 21
st
 
century, it will be necessary to look for new sources of explanation, new models that are 
capable of unravelling the complexity of a rapidly changing milieu. The theory developed in 
the 1960s and 1970s is no longer able to do that. 
 
Towards a New Theoretical Basis for Disaster Studies 
The modern world is characterised by increasing imbalances in access to wealth and 
resources, in safety and in opportunities for betterment (Massey, 1996). Misuse of resources 
and excessive emphasis on economic development without taking into account the full costs 
may exacerbate these disequilibria. New theory needs to be able to describe and interpret 
this situation, as well as respond to the profound changes in global interconnectedness that 
are occurring. 
Human ecology posits a relationship between people and their environment in which 
technology can overcome some of the difficulties, but nature is not easily dominated and 
hence there must be adaptation to extremes (White, 1974). In the original work, the model 
is based on the work of Herbert Simon on the rational man who makes economic decisions 
as an optimiser, by maximising opportunities to gather information, or a satisficer, by 
choosing rationally from a limited range of options (Simon, 1956). Evidently, this model 
allows no room for cultural or ideological variations and only the most limited opportunity 
for perception to govern choice. In reality, there is a constant dialectic between factors that 
increase risk (for example, stronger hurricanes, building new settlement in vulnerable areas, 
water management that increases downstream flood risk) and those that diminish it, the 
actions of disaster risk mitigation. The dialectic is further modified by risk perception, which 
can either increase or decrease vulnerability, depending on its level of salience and accuracy. 
Hence, in schematic terms: 
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Total vulnerability to disasters = 
Risk amplification processes – 
Risk mitigation processes ± 
Risk perception factors 
 
In disaster risk reduction, decisions, actions and results all depend on a complex 
interaction between perception and culture. 
 
The Importance of Culture and Symbolism in Disaster Risk Reduction 
Remarkably few academic studies of disaster tackle the problem of culture (Gheradi, 1998). 
The term can be defined as an assemblage of shared beliefs, opinions, social characteristics 
and attitudes. Culture is extremely difficult to measure in any social scientific way (Brislin, 
1980). One reason is that it is an elusive and multi-faceted concept, one that changes with 
social context. Another is that culture is, like Chinese boxes or Russian dolls, a set of nested 
phenomena: we respond to different cultures related to national, regional and local settings; 
peer groups, families and workplaces; ethnic and social groups; gender and race; and 
interest groups. A third reason is that culture undergoes a constant process of 
metamorphosis as it adapts to the changing circumstances of the modern world and how we 
are able to interpret it. As a result, there are very few reliable measures of culture. It is 
nonetheless highly important. If one wants to promote change, success is more likely if it is 
compatible with the prevailing culture, while if it runs against the culture, the adaptive 
process is likely to be blocked for apparently illogical reasons. 
Each of us inherits a cultural background that is more or less evident depending on the 
strength of ties to particular places and social groups. We spend our lives accumulating 
cultural characteristics by processes of learning and assimilation. These are the emic 
components of culture – those that are specific to a particular cultural context. The etic 
aspects are related to universal traits and are the source of much cultural metamorphosis. In 
the present age they are mostly the result of the diffusion of mass culture and the 
technology that propagates it. Hence, modernism fuses with ancient cultural traditions: 
symbiotically, the former is interpreted in the light of the latter (Figure 1). 
Figure 1 illustrates that culture is not a static phenomenon, but one that carries its own 
dynamism. Nevertheless, we should not be beguiled by its dynamic aspects, namely the 
mass-consumer culture inherent in the etic, or universal, aspects of modern life. 
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 Figure 1. The architecture and metamorphosis of human culture 
 
These are important sources of cultural uniformity in the modern world, but we should 
remember that beneath them there are accumulated and inherited traits that are also 
capable of influencing our attitudes and responses to disaster. The next section will show 
that the response to the 6 April 2009 earthquake in L'Aquila, central Italy, demonstrates a 
sudden, almost spontaneous desire for modernity, as evinced by forms of reconstruction 
that show a distinct break with traditional urban form. In contrast, the political power 
relations that conditioned the choices made in the reconstruction process reflect more the 
weight of history, the emic processes of a social fabric that is slow to evolve, than the etic 
ones found in modernism. 
Culture is important to any understanding of the significance and role of disaster in the 
modern world because it determines how perception is interpreted, and, indeed, may even 
determine what is perceived. Thus we understand disaster through a perceptual and cultural 
filter that has many levels, from individual, through family, peer group, organisation, 
community, region and nation, right up to the international, etic forms of popular culture. By 
way of example, community-based forms of disaster reduction should take account of the 
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ways in which people in the community associate with each other, including forms of 
meeting and debate (the socialisation of the problem) and community power structures and 
sources of authority. All of these elements are to some extent culturally determined. 
In this context, students of disaster have largely ignored the role of symbols and 
symbolism. Yet they have been important throughout history and are no less relevant today, 
albeit in a radically different context (Alexander, 2004). Once upon a time the appearance of 
a comet in the sky might have been interpreted as a portent of doom and destruction. 
Nowadays symbols are the simplest form of model of a reality that is increasingly complex as 
more and more information becomes available. Symbols and symbolism are a natural 
response to the domination of communication by electronic representations of reality, many 
of which are severely reductive. 
One effect of the information technology revolution has been to change the symbolic 
interpretation of disaster. Sixty years ago to be involved in disaster was, in many cultures, to 
be subject to a form of disgrace that could hardly be talked about. Nowadays such 
involvement has been radically transformed by mass media attention. To be a victim of 
disaster may even be a route to celebrity. This has to do with the interpretation of disaster – 
symbolically – as a form of moral outrage (Horlick-Jones, 1995) in which the victim gains the 
weight of moral authority simply by being involved. However, for this to be true, much 
depeŶds oŶ the ͞stoƌǇ ǀalue͟ (i.e. singularity, novelty, human interest, etc.) that the mass 
media can attribute to the situation and its protagonists. 
It may be true that the key to interpreting disasters is to be found in the works of Carl 
Gustav Jung (͞ŵaŶ aŶd his sǇŵďols,͟ 1964), Roland Barthes (͞seŵiotics and myth,͟ 2009), 
Umberto Eco (͞semiotics and popular culture,͟ 1978) and Zigmunt Bauman (͞liƋuid 
ŵodeƌŶitǇ,͟ 2001). All three branches of semiotics could be involved in this process. First, 
semantics, the relationship between signs and the denotata, the things which they endow 
with meaning, can help us understand the gap between how people perceive hazard, risk 
and disaster and how these phenomena are in scientific terms. In previous works I listed up 
to 47 common misconceptions about disaster and analysed how some of these influence the 
judgement of people involved in managing emergencies. Secondly, syntactics, the 
relationships among signs in formal structures, can help us understand how the 
representation of disasters is codified by the groups and cultures involved. This is the 
shorthand interpretation of risk and impact for the purposes of rapid reaction, the language 
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of response to hazard. Thirdly and finally, pragmatics, the relationships between signs and 
their effect on people who use them, can help us understand the feedback between the 
symbolic representations of disastrous phenomena, risks and extreme events and the 
meanings that both result from and generate these models. 
A word of warning must be issued about the concepts of vulnerability and risk. They are 
akin to friction, a quality that does not exist until it is mobilised. Students of disaster will 
have noted that the 'hard' science interpretation of risk is fundamentally different from the 
social science interpretation (Slovic and Gregory, 1999). Engineering risk usually involves 
calculating the probability of failure of a built structure under specific conditions of loading. 
Social science risk brings into play factors such as perception that cannot easily be 
quantified, or when quantification is attempted the result is less than satisfying (Purchase 
and Slovic, 1999). Thus risk and its dominant component vulnerability are in essence 
hypothetical concepts. Paradoxically they are no less real for being hypothetical. However, 
once they are mobilised they are instantly transformed into impact. It is thus hardly 
surprising that risk and vulnerability remain elusive – though not illusive – concepts that defy 
holistic measurement or assessment. To understand either we must descend to the level of 
partial estimation, using a set of qualifying conditions, for example, risk over defined time 
periods and with respect to one sector, such as economic activity, or infection and disease. 
Unfortunately, many of the ideas expressed above are only half formed. Their full 
development requires considerably greater and more penetrating observation over longer 
periods of time. In addition, such periods will inevitably be characterised by rapid and 
profound changes in society and the environment of life. Nevertheless, it is possible to make 
a start on interpreting current reality using new models. The next section will present a short 
example. 
 
Interpretations of the L'Aquila (Central Italy) Earthquake of 6 April 2009 
At 03:32 hrs local time on Monday 6 April 2009 an earthquake of magnitude Mw=6.3, 
duration 25 seconds and mean peak acceleration 0.3g occurred with epicentre 3.4 km from 
the centre of L'Aquila, a city of 72,800 inhabitants located in the Apennine mountains of 
central Italy in Abruzzo Region. In total, 308 people were killed, 1500 were injured, 202 of 
them seriously, 67,000 people were left homeless and about 100,000 buildings were 
seriously damaged. The earthquake formed part of a swarm of tremors that began in 
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October 2008 and did not attenuate until the following summer. L'Aquila had been struck by 
a devastating seismic event in 1703 with 6,000-10,000 deaths, but the last major earthquake 
in Abruzzo happened at Avezzano, about 100 km southeast of L'Aquila in 1915. It killed 
32,000 people, including 94 per cent of the population of Avezzano. The death toll in 2009 
could have been much higher had the earthquake not occurred during a long weekend when 
many people were away from the area. 
The L'Aquila earthquake was a moderate physical event but, due to high levels of seismic 
vulnerability, it had a disproportionately large impact on the population of the area affected, 
with 16 municipalities severely damaged and up to 98 affected, 49 of them seriously. The 
disaster was thus a significant test of the Italian national civil protection system, which 
responded with a major and sustained mobilisation of national resources. Given the risk of 
structural collapse among buildings weakened by the earthquake, L'Aquila city and several 
local towns were put off limits to the general population, the first time in the history of 
modern Italy that a major city had been totally evacuated, moreover for a period exceeding 
one year (Stucchi et al., 2009). 
At the time of the earthquake, rescue of the survivors was complicated by the partial 
collapse of San Salvatore, the main regional hospital and the one medical centre best 
adapted to emergency response for a mass casualty situation. Within 24 hours the first of 
two large field hospitals was set up and active in the vicinity, but several hours after the 
earthquake San Salvatore had to be taken out of use and evacuated for fear of structural 
collapse. Immediate medical response was thus largely carried out by military medivac, 
evacuation of seriously injured patients by air to hospitals in the surrounding region, most of 
them at considerable distance from L'Aquila. 
Of the 67,000 homeless survivors, about 21,000 were accommodated in 171 tent camps, 
mostly in tents for eight people. A similar number were put up in hotels, many on the 
Adriatic coast on the other side of the Apennine Mountains. The remainder were either 
found accommodation on their own or left the region. The tent camps remained for six 
months, throughout the summer, until they were replaced with transitional housing. This 
was of two types: C.A.S.E. (Complessi Antisismici Sostenibili ed Ecocompatibili) and M.A.P. 
(Moduli Abitativi Provvisori). The CASE project consisted of 184 multiple occupancy units 
with antiseismic base isolation constructed at 19 sites in the vicinity of L'Aquila (Figure 2). 
The MAP units were smaller prefabricated buildings without base isolation that were 
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erected at more than 50 sites in the area. Some 15,500 people were accommodated in the 
CASE units and 8,500 at the MAP sites (Calvi and Spaziante, 2009). 
 
Figure 2. CASE transitional housing at Bazzano outside L'Aquila city (photo by author). 
The base isolation columns support the building and protect it from earthquake shaking. 
 
The Italian Government's immediate- and short-term strategies for managing the 
earthquake involved the doctrine of overwhelming force (Alexander, 2010). Huge numbers 
of vehicles and vast stockpiles of materials were rapidly assembled and applied to the 
problems of cordoning off the areas of destruction, buttressing precarious buildings, feeding 
and housing displaced populations and coordinating the flow of relief goods and personnel. 
As usual, the Italian Fire Brigades constituted the lead agency. Blue-light services and the 
hundreds of civil protection volunteer organisations were coordinated by the National 
Department of Civil Protection. The strategy was successful, but it remains to be seen 
whether such a measure could be adopted in the case of a major earthquake over a much 
wider area and involving a much larger population. 
The medium-term strategy is yet more controversial. Because of the damage to 
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vernacular housing, earthquake disasters involve sudden and massive homelessness. The 
most common strategy for dealing with this is to use tents and improvised shelter for a very 
short period of time (a matter of days or a very few weeks) and then provide cheap but 
robust transitional shelter using container homes or small, light-walled prefabs, which 
typically have a floor area of 30-40 sq. metres and are allotted as one per family (Aysan and 
Davis, 1992). 
The cost of such housing is usually in the range 12,000-15,000 per unit, including the 
minimum essential urbanisation of sites and construction of temporary networks for the 
distribution of utilities. In L'Aquila the cost of the CASE units ǁoƌked out at €ϯ,ϳϱϬ peƌ 
sƋuaƌe ŵetƌe, aŶ aǀeƌage of €ϮϴϬ,ϲϬϳ peƌ faŵilǇ uŶit ;Calǀi aŶd “paziaŶte, 2009), as much as 
a comparable apartment in a major city. At the same time much money was spent on 
intensively buttressing the ruined buildings in the town centres, which remained cordoned 
off against public access. However, the government could not afford to remove the 
estimated 4-5 million tonnes of rubble from these sites. The CASE units did not live up to 
their designation as 'ecocompatible'. Although they have solar panels for water heating, lack 
of services and public transportation has induced a massive dependency on the private car. 
In the meantime nothing has been done to improve the local infrastructure or access to 
services. Nor has the economy been bolstered. There is evidence of economic stagnation, 
outmigration of workers and the loss of something between 16,000 and 26,000 jobs as a 
direct result of the destruction of shops, studios and businesses by the earthquake. 
Moreover, the devolution of taxation so ardently promoted by successive Italian 
governments since the 1990s has proved advantageous to some provinces of Italy and 
fiscally regressive to others. L'Aquila is the worst affected example of the latter. 
The Italian Government's overall strategy for coping with the L'Aquila earthquake is 
difficult to analyse in anything but political terms. In mid-2009, the Prime Minister, Silvio 
Berlusconi, afflicted by scandals and loss of popularity, pledged to rehouse within six months 
all the families made homeless by the earthquake. Hence they were left in tents during the 
long hot summer and as the autumn weather cooled they were rehoused in the rapidly 
constructed CASE and MAP units. It was a remarkable logistical achievement, and one that 
involved little or no loss of quality between the design and the realisation of all the homes. It 
gave the Government and Prime Minister a substantial political advantage that they were 
able to exploit, adroitly, in order to gain votes in regional and local elections. 
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However, the rehousing was achieved at a very high price. To begin with, the cost of the 
transitional housing was more than twenty times what more economic shelter would have 
cost. Secondly, nothing was invested in transportation and services, leaving sites that had 
populations of up to 2,500 people devoid of shops, community centres, coffee bars, bus 
services, clinics, schools and doctors' surgeries. Moreover, little attention was paid to the 
problem of conserving social cohesion in the assignment of transitional housing units. This 
has led to high levels of isolation, depression and post-traumatic stress among the assignees. 
In conclusion, the lavish scale of buttressing and vast sums spent on transitional housing 
have left little or nothing for reconstruction. The physical aspect of these two initiatives 
suggests that the Government has prepared the way for a long interval, perhaps decades, 
before reconstruction occurs – if it ever does. There is a precedent for this as the Belice 
Valley of western Sicily, another Italian backwater, went through 15 years of stagnation 
between the earthquakes of 1968 and the inauguration of a significant amount of 
reconstructed housing and urban services (Angotti, 1977). 
The political symbolism of giving homeless people decent housing cannot be 
underestimated. The Italian Government provided everything, right down to furniture, 
cutlery, crockery, linen, televisions and electrical equipment. The model for this is Milano 
Due, the speculative residential development in Segrate, Milan, built over the period 1970-
79, that propelled Silvio Berlusconi from obscurity to national prominence. Largesse was an 
instantaneous vote winner, but state paternalism has destroyed governance, in the sense 
intended by the definition given earlier in this paper. Dissent is barely tolerated and L'Aquila 
has once again become politically, economically and socially marginalised in national life. 
The tyranny of geography is that, although it is barely 120 km from the centre of Rome, 
L'Aquila lies in an intermontane basin with relatively poor connections to other parts of Italy. 
Its only major source of employment is the local university, at a time in which Italian higher 
education is in a state of very severe depression. 
In L'Aquila political protest and dissent have been dealt with by government forces using 
violence and intimidation. Taxation has been inimical to enterprise. Emergent groups have 
been created, but they have not achieved the critical mass or prominence to have much 
influence on a situation characterised by stagnation and decline. The ancient cultural 
background of the area is characterised by poverty and feudal dependence. Although 
absolute poverty has gone, traces of the feudal dependence remain, along with the 
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economic depression of a region that has not been given the best possible incentives to 
grow and develop its rather scarce resources. Although chronicles of the miseria of the 
peasant area are in no way diagnostic of modern conditions, there are parallels in the 
inherited cultural background, especially in the conservatism of a people that for too long 
has had too much to lose by protesting (Russo, 1955). The biggest victim is good governance 
and any prosperity that might have resulted from it. 
One characteristic of traditional societies seems to be the particular plight of women. 
Although the situation in L'Aquila is not as severe as it is in many countries, the earthquake 
nevertheless created a discernable gender bias (cf. Enarson and Morrow, 1998). More 
women were killed than men, especially in the age groups 30-39 and 70+. Even when one 
corrects for the demographic imbalance between the sexes in old age, the anomaly remains 
(Alexander, 2011). The explanation is difficult to formulate but probably relates to the lower 
mobility of women than men: some of the men who were registered as resident in the area 
were probably not physically present on the night of the earthquake. Whatever the 
explanation, research has revealed that women also suffered more than men from post-
traumatic stress during the months after the earthquake ;Dell’Osso et al., 2011). 
The L'Aquila earthquake and its aftermath are open to various forms of symbolic 
interpretation. To begin with, it was the first major test of the current Italian civil protection 
system since the 1980 earthquake in southern Italy. It thus reflected the competence of the 
nation in the face of a severe natural emergency. Secondly, the whole disaster was 
overshadowed by political considerations, in the light of the Italian government's need to 
gain short-term popularity for electoral reasons and in order to maintain its power base. The 
G8 summit that was held in L'Aquila from 8-10 July 2009 represented the apex of this 
process. In reality the summit did little for the plight of the Aquilani, but it was redolent with 
symbolic moments. For example, the village most affected by the earthquake was Onna, in 
which 40 of the 300 inhabitants died when 60 per cent of the building stock collapsed. On 11 
June 1944 Onna had been the scene of a massacre of 18 local civilians by German troops and 
during the summit the German Foreign Minister pledged funds towards the post-earthquake 
reconstruction, a highly symbolic gesture in the light of current moves towards European 
unity. 
Like many modern catastrophes, the L'Aquila earthquake was a drama played out in the 
mass media, especially television, which maintained a constant presence there for weeks. 
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Modern post-disaster solidarity has a very public face, much at variance with the discretion 
of previous ages (Alexander, 2006). However, the problem with media coverage is that it 
does not necessarily present a consistent and accurate picture of the reality on the ground. 
Coverage varies from day to day much more than the situation itself does. Moreover, many 
of the most serious problems, for example bureaucratic stagnation, are not particularly 
newsworthy. In contrast, it proved easy to interpret the disaster in terms of, for example, 
the charity, piety and pity inherent in Catholicism, one of the principal cultural subtexts. 
Finally, despite economic stagnation, lack of reconstruction and lack of improvement of 
the local infrastructure, some remarkable transformations occurred in the L'Aquila area. For 
instance, construction in the region has for centuries been dominated by the use of stone 
from which reinforced concrete has taken over (with decidedly mixed results in terms of 
seismic response). Suddenly, in the aftermath of the earthquake there was an enormous 
accession of wood and steel construction, much of it arranged in parks, or estates, in the 
Anglo-Saxon manner. Symbolically, it seemed to represent a sudden modernisation of a very 
ancient area (L'Aquila city is 1000 years old and many of the surrounding settlements are 
twice as ancient), or at least a desire for modernisation. Given the paternalism and lack of 
governance, one might almost call it a forced modernisation. There is a strong risk in such 
cases that it will destroy a genius loci acquired over the centuries. In Italy historic 
settlements depend for their identity on a number of iconic monuments and a distinctive 
kind of urban form. To erase any of that would only cut people off from their history and 
diminish their sense of social identity. There would thus be discord in the semantics of 
semiotic analysis, and probably also in the pragmatics (Eco, 1978). 
Much more could be done to interpret the situation in L'Aquila in semiotic terms, and the 
raw material is definitely available. However, that must await further research and in the 
meantime it is necessary to draw some conclusions. 
 
Conclusion: Social Models of Disaster 
The earliest human ecological models of disaster were linear in conception. Hazard acted 
upon vulnerability to produce disaster. It followed that, as hazards were at the start of the 
process, they received the lion's share of the attention. This was also in line with the 
dominance of physical over social sciences at the time. Over the period 1979-83, researchers 
working in developing countries produced the so-Đalled ͞radical critique,͟ which argued that 
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in the explanation of disaster vulnerability carries more weight than hazard (Hewitt, 1983). 
As a result of feedback loops, hazard can be regarded as a trigger for the social processes 
that create vulnerability, which is the principal determinant of disaster potential. 
Increasing knowledge of disasters and the social processes involved, and the complexity 
of life in the early 21
st
 century, suggest that a new model ought to be formulated (Figure 3). 
The vulnerability of human socio-economic systems is acted upon by physical hazards 
(whether natural or anthropogenic), as well as cultural and historical factors. The plexus of 
the context and consequences of these associations is what determines the form, entity and 
size of any ensuing disaster. 
 
Figure 3. Possible evolution of models of disaster 
 
Clearly, this model is both preliminary and schematic. Much work needs to be done to fill 
in the details and clarify the relationships. For instance, history is a vital explanatory factor 
(and we live in an age that is apt to forget its lessons), but it does not determine the future, 
it merely contributes some important ingredients. Much lateral thinking will be required if 
disaster is to be interpreted creatively and with penetrating insight. Trends and tendencies 
RCCS Annual Review, 4, October 2012                                                                                                            Models of Social Vulnerability to Disasters 
 
 
38 
will have to be understood and incorporated into this process, and we live in a world that is 
consuming resources at an accelerating rate, that is undergoing environmental change at an 
ever faster speed, and that is becoming increasingly crowded with people who live, travel 
and work in hazardous areas. Finally, any valid, workable explanation of disaster for the new 
millennium must include the effects of technological change, which has radically altered the 
ways in which we see and interpret catastrophe. Hence, we face both an intellectual and a 
practical challenge, which is worth rising to, as theory is the "road map" by which we 
navigate through the chaos of disaster and risk situations and are thus able to manage them. 
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